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To what extent are people able to make predictions about other people’s preferences
and values? We report two experiments that present a novel method assessing some of
the basic processes in surrogate decision-making, namely surrogate-utility estimation. In
each experiment participants formed dyads who were asked to assign utilities to health
related items and commodity items, and to predict their partner’s utility judgments for the
same items. In experiment one we showed that older adults in long-term relationships
were able to accurately predict their partner’s wishes. In experiment two we showed
that younger adults who were relatively unfamiliar with one another were also able to
predict other people’s wishes. Crucially we demonstrated that these judgments were
accurate even after partialling out each participant’s own preferences indicating that in
order to make surrogate utility estimations people engage in perspective-taking rather
than simple anchoring and adjustment, suggesting that utility estimation is not the cause
of inaccuracy in surrogate decision-making. The data and implications are discussed
with respect to theories of surrogate decision-making.
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Introduction
Making decisions can be very difficult and stressful, particularly when they have significant
implications for our health, finances and future happiness. As we lack the benefit of hindsight,
the choices we make are often characterized by uncertainty over which choice is more likely
to lead to a desired outcome or even which outcome might be preferable. This uncertainty is
likely to increase when we have to make decisions for other people. In addition to the uncer-
tainty over the decision itself, this adds the complication of getting inside someone else’s head
to make a decision which they would value. We have no direct access to other people’s thoughts
and feelings, but we can try and take their perspective, although this is a process often sub-
ject to an egocentric bias (Epley et al., 2004). How then do people go about predicting the
value another person places on objects or experiences, and how accurate are those predictions?
These surrogate utility estimates are likely to be extremely common and essential to a range
of decisions from buying a birthday present of an appropriate value (Davis et al., 1986) to
decisions about end-of-life care (Moorman and Carr, 2008). Despite this little is known about
the psychological processes involved in surrogate decision-making. In this paper we explore an
important part of any surrogate decision, namely the estimation of another person’s subjective
utility.
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Surrogate Decision-Making
The majority of research on surrogate decision-making has been
conducted in a medical context, in part because of the signif-
icance of the decisions, and also because the recipients of the
decisions are often incapable of making decisions for themselves
or are legally unable to give informed consent. For example, a
growing literature is concerned with the accuracy of end-of-life
care decisions (e.g., Moorman et al., 2009). Typically, in these
sorts of studies patients and their next of kin are asked if they
or their partner would choose a life-sustaining intervention in
the event of a hypothetical medical scenario that might prevent
death but leave the patient with a poor quality of life. Accuracy is
measured as the agreement rate between the next-of-kin’s predic-
tion about what their partner would choose, and what the patient
actually chose (Fagerlin et al., 2001). In the United States and
many other countries the optimal outcome is that the surrogate
makes a judgment that meets the Substituted Judgment Standard
(Stanley, 1989) which requires that the decision-maker set aside
their own preferences, and make a decision that they believe the
patient would choose if they were able to do so, even if this con-
tradicts the surrogate’s own beliefs. However, a recent systematic
review of the literature concluded that on average the agreement
rate between next-of-kin and patient is in the region of 66%
(Shalowitz et al., 2006). What these studies all show is that people
are above chance in their predictions but less than perfectly accu-
rate, even when the surrogate and beneficiary are familiar with
one another. Unfortunately, because the decisions are essentially
binary in nature they tell us little about the underlying psycho-
logical processes that the surrogate might use to make those deci-
sions and where they might fail. Surrogate decision-making must
involve an assessment of the beneficiary’s attitudes to risk and
their subjective utility. In this sense, surrogate decision-making
may not differ from prospect theory or any other general descrip-
tive model of decision-making for that matter. Despite this there
have been few attempts to describe how the processes involved
in making decisions are utilized in making decisions on behalf
of another person. To date these all appear to be derivatives of
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Social Values Theory (Stone and Allgaier, 2008; Stone et al.,
2013) predicts that the social value placed on the outcome is the
predominant factor in the surrogate decision. In this model the
surrogate uses an essentially heuristic process of recommending
the option with themost socially sanctioned or desirable outcome
instead of making a utility estimation. In this sense the surrogate
decision-maker makes what is essentially an egocentric decision
that benefits their own reputation rather than what the other per-
son might prefer or what might be best for them. This heuristic
could be motivated by a genuine expectation that the recipient’s
wishes would be consistent with social norms about the deci-
sion, and this could be more likely in situations with uncertain
outcomes such as a medical decision. This model predicts that
surrogate decisionmakers will makemore risk averse decisions in
situations in which safety is considered socially desirable or val-
ued by the recipient compared to decisions in a context in which
risk might bemore desirable (e.g., romantic decisions, gambling).
By contrast, when the decision maker makes a decision for him-
self or herself, they are more likely to engage in an analytic
decision-making process. In many ways this model is consistent
with Kahneman’s Systems model (Kahneman, 2011). This model
might account for some relatively trivial surrogate-decision, and
perhaps even some profound ones too. But the model as it is
described deals with a relatively narrow set of risky decisions that
are different from utility based decisions that we are concerned
with here. It seems unlikely that every surrogate decision is sim-
ple matter of heuristic reputation management. For example, it
is unlikely that the next of kin makes an end-of-life decision, on
the basis of what other people might think of the decision rather
than weighing up the quality of life of their partner. Similarly,
a physician when asked to recommend a treatment makes the
decision on the basis of the expected outcomes and risks. Indeed
there is some evidence that physicians might make more analytic
decisions on behalf of their patients and heuristic ones for them-
selves (Ubel et al., 2011; Garcia-Retamero and Galesic, 2012). So
although the model may be relevant to some kinds of decisions
these may be limited. Nonetheless, if a legally designated surro-
gate decision maker were to base their surrogate decision on a
social values heuristic then their intention would fail to meet the
substituted judgment standard. The social values model does not
claim, however, to address surrogate medical decisions.
The Egocentric Anchoring and Adjustmentmodel (Epley et al.,
2004; Epley and Gilovich, 2006) does include an analytic pro-
cess for both surrogate and self decision-making. In this model,
when making decisions on behalf of other people, or predicting
the decision that another person might make, people use their
own preference as a reference point or anchor. For example, they
might initially analyse the decision in terms of what they would
choose, and in doing so, implicitly or otherwise, make a subjective
utility estimation. The surrogates then make the assumption that
people have similar preferences to them and that they are likely
to have a similar anchor point, whilst simultaneously recogniz-
ing that different people have different perspectives and prefer-
ences. The consequence is that the decision-maker adjusts their
estimation of the other person’s subjective utility around their
own anchor point to reflect what they know of the differences
between them and the other person. The adjustments involve dis-
crete changes away from the anchor point and a satisficing stop-
ping rule is applied after each adjustment. If the decision maker
believes that the adjustment reflects the other person’s perspective
then the process stops, if not then a further adjustment is made.
The combination of an anchoring and adjustment process and
a satisficing rule results in a general egocentric bias in surrogate
decision-making.
However, although this model can account for some errors in
self-other decisionmaking it does not make a distinction between
predicting what another person would choose (a surrogate deci-
sion) and what they should choose (a benevolent decision), or
account for the possibility that a surrogate decision maker may
simply choose a course of action in their own favor rather than
one that they think is in the beneficiaries’ best interest or what
they would choose for themselves. Indeed the model does not
account for the common problem of people making decisions
that they know to be less than optimal. Moreover, neither the
Social Values model nor the Anchoring and Adjustment model
account for how well the surrogate and beneficiary know each
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other. It seems reasonable to assume that the closer the relation-
ship between two people then the more likely they are to be aware
of each other’s goals and values, and what they might choose to
do in hypothetical situations. The Somatic Distortion theory of
Surrogate Decision Making (Tunney and Ziegler, under review)
attempts to capture the potential conflicts between the different
perspectives one might encounter when making a decision on
behalf of another person. The model incorporates factors that
can influence perspective taking such as the familiarity between
decision-maker and recipient and individual differences in empa-
thy. In doing so the model should predict when a surrogate
decision might be accurate and when surrogate decision-making
might fail.
The Somatic Distortion model assumes that when making a
decision on behalf of another person, the decision maker com-
pares the preferred outcome from a number of different per-
spectives. The decision maker considers what they would do if
they were the beneficiary of the decision, they simulate what
they believe the beneficiary would choose, and what they believe
the best outcome for the beneficiary would be irrespective of
their own wishes or the beneficiaries’. We refer to each per-
spective as Projected, Simulated, and Benevolent, respectively.
Of course, the decision-maker might simply decide what they
would prefer the outcome to be irrespective of either the bene-
ficiaries’ wishes, or indeed what they would chose if they were
the beneficiary. In this egocentric scenario the decision maker
does not attempt to make a surrogate decision and no the-
ory of surrogate decision-making is required. In computing a
decision from each perspective the decision maker makes an
estimated subjective utility judgment. The subjective utility esti-
mation is distorted as a function of the participants’ knowl-
edge or familiarity with the beneficiary. For example, one is
unlikely to have a casual conversation with a passing acquain-
tance about the relative merits of euthanasia, and so one might
assume a stranger’s preferences on average conform to social
norms. On the other hand, we are much more likely to dis-
cuss, or share, our social values with our family and our close
friends. Given that what we would choose might be different
from what we think another person might choose, and that both
perspectives could be different again from what we believe the
best choice (the benevolent choice) to be, the model includes a
simple majority choice rule to decide what the actual surrogate
decision would be. Of course, empathy is an individual differ-
ence and we expect that the extent to which a surrogate util-
ity judgment matches that of another person will vary not only
as a function of external factors such as familiarity, but also
of internal factors such as one’s ability to take another person’s
perspective. In addition to the familiarity between the surro-
gate decision maker and the recipient, the model also assumes
that the ability to take another person’s perspective (empathy)
affects the relationship between surrogates’ predictions and pref-
erences of the recipient. Faro and Rottenstreich (2006) provide
some tentative evidence to this effect. They showed that an
establishedmeasure of empathy (Davis, 1983) predicted the accu-
racy of surrogate decisions about risky choices. Our model pre-
dicts that relatively more empathetic people are more likely to
make a simulated judgment than relatively less empathetic people
who are more likely to make either a projected or egocentric
decision.
A number of studies have shown that people make more
impulsive decisions for themselves than they would do on behalf
of another person, or that they predict another person would
make. For example, Ziegler and Tunney (2012) asked participants
to choose between a series of smaller-sooner and larger-later
financial rewards for themselves or for a variety of people who
varied in psychological distance from them. The results suggested
a negative linear relationship between impulsivity and distance in
which decisions for complete strangers were the least impulsive.
When asked to make decisions about risk we tend to assume
that other people are more risk seeking than ourselves for both
positive and negative scenarios, and, as with delay-reward dis-
counting the effect is moderated by the construal distance of the
outcome (Hsee and Weber, 1997). This gives rise to an empathy
gap in which the decision maker feels the visceral consequences
of a decision less for strangers than for the people they know
(Loewenstein, 2000). This effect occurs for both standard lotter-
ies and even sealed bid auctions (Chakravarty et al., 2011) and
has clear implications for the investment strategy of traders in
financial markets. In other situations that involve decisions about
risky behaviors, but do not necessarily require an explicit risk
computation, people show the same pattern of making or rec-
ommending riskier decisions for other people than they would
for themselves. For example, Beisswanger et al. (2003) found
that participants were more likely to recommend that other peo-
ple engaged in risky romantic scenarios (e.g., a blind date) than
they would choose to do themselves. Interestingly the effect was
larger for trivial decisions than for more profound ones (dates vs.
marriage: see also Stone et al., 2013).
In the two experiments that follow we assess the extent to
which people are able to predict someone else’s utility judgments
and test the predictions of the Somatic Distortion Theory of Sur-
rogate Decision Making that familiarity and empathy affect those
predictions.
Experiment One
In Experiment one we sought to develop a methodology to mea-
sure how similar surrogate utility estimation is to another persons
utility judgments. In particular we wanted to measure the extent
to which a utility judgment made on behalf of another person
was a projection of their own preferences, or an accurate reflec-
tion of their partners’ preferences. In keeping with the established
literature we recruited older adults in established relationships
and asked them to state their own subjective utilities for lifestyle
items (selling price) or for health benefits (time trade-offs) using
materials developed by Chapman and Johnson (1995).
Method
Materials
The materials were a set of 10 health state trade-offs and 10
lifestyle items developed by Chapman and Johnson (1995) See
Appendix A. Each participant rated two different versions of each
trade-off: one that referred to themselves and one that referred
to their partner. For the health state items the participants were
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asked to state the number of years added to their lives required to
be willing to give up a particular health benefit, and also estimate
the number of years they thought that their partner would require
for the same exchange. For the lifestyle items the participants
stated their minimum selling price, and predicted what their
partners’ minimum selling price would be for a set of lifestyle
items.
Participants
The participants were recruited from the Lincolnshire branch of
the University of the Third Age, an international organization
that promotes life-long learning. The participants were 44 older
adults in long-term relationships. All the participants were in het-
erosexual relationships resulting in the sample being composed
of 22 males and 22 females. Their average age was 59.09 years
(sd = 8.72), the average length of relationship was 31.68 years
(sd = 10.66).
Procedure
Participants were tested in their pairs on separate computers and
were not permitted to communicate with each other during the
task. On the computer screens the participants were presented
with the 40 items shown in Appendix A. Of these half were com-
modity/lifestyle items, and half were health related items. Each
participant in each dyad provided two utility estimates for each
item. For the health items they made a time trade-off and a pre-
dicted time trade-off for the other member of the dyad, so the
utility for health items is expressed in years ranging from 0 to 50
years. For the lifestyle items the utilities are expressed in US dol-
lars ranging from $0 to $20,000. The task was self-paced, and the
order in which the items were presented was fully randomized for
each participant. This study was approved by the Ethics commit-
tee in the University of Lincoln School of Psychology and con-
forms to British Psychological Society’s Code of Human Research
Ethics.
Results
Each participant in each dyad made a time trade-off for each
health item and a predicted time trade-off for their partner. The
participants said that they would exchange on average 12.49 years
(sd = 8.29), and predicted that their partner would exchange
13.07 years (sd = 8.73). This difference was not significant
(t43 < 1.0). The difference between predicted partners’ trade-
offs and their partners’ actual trade-offs was also not significant
(t43 < 1.0). The average selling price for lifestyle items was
slightly higher for oneself ($1005.32, sd = 2235.74) than they
predicted for their partners although this difference did not reach
significance ($785.94, sd = 1699.05, t43 = 1.83, se = 119.96,
p = 0.07). The difference between what the participants pre-
dicted their partners’ selling price would be and their partners’
actual selling price was not significant (t43 < 1.00).
For each participant we first computed the within-subject cor-
relations between their own utility judgments and what they pre-
dicted for their partner. We refer to this correlation as projection
as it is a measure of how closely one’s own preferences are to the
predictions about another person’s preferences. The average cor-
relation coefficient between each participant’s time trade-off for
health items and what they predicted for their partner was signif-
icant (r = 0.42, sd = 0.37, t43 = 7.57, p < 0.01). The correlation
between participants’ own selling prices for the lifestyle items
and what they predicted for their partners was also significant
(r = 0.45, sd = 0.399; t43 = 7.41, p < 0.01).
These results nicely demonstrate a general agreement between
participants’ own utilities and how much they think their part-
ners might value the same items. However, this might merely be
a form of projected utility estimation. To determine the relation-
ship between those predictions we next computed the within-
subject correlations between the predicted utilities and the actual
stated utilities of the other participant in the dyad.We refer to this
measure as accuracy, because it is a measure of the association
between the predicted preference and the other person’s actual
preferences. The average within-dyad correlation between what
participants predicted their partners’ selling price for the lifestyle
items would be and what their partner actually stated was also
significant (r = 0.33, sd = 0.396; t43 = 5.58, p < 0.01), as
was the within-dyad correlation between predicted time trade-
offs and actual time trade-offs (r = 0.39, sd = 0.37, t43 = 7.094,
p < 0.01).
To determine the extent to which participants’ surrogate deci-
sions were independent of their own projected preferences or a
simulation of their partners’ wishes we next computed partial-
correlations between what they predicted for their partner and
what their partner actually stated while controlling for their own
utility judgments. The mean partial correlation coefficient for
health items was reliably greater than chance (mean r = 0.26,
sd = 0.41; t43 = 4.25, p < 0.01) and the mean partial corre-
lation coefficient for lifestyle items was also reliably greater than
chance (mean r = 0.25, sd = 0.42; t43 = 3.87, p < 0.01). This
suggests that participants are able to predict their partners’ util-
ity judgments as being different to their own. We interpret this as
evidence of simulation in surrogate utility estimation rather than
simple projections.
These data confirm the view that participants’ estimates
of their partners’ utility judgments are similar to their own.
These data are consistent with both the Anchoring and Adjust-
ment Model, but also the Somatic Distortion Model. Of course
the observation that these predictions are relatively close also
confirms the view that people place similar values on similar
things. However, when we partialled out participants’ own utility
estimates the correlations between predicted utilities and actual
utilities remained significant. Our interpretation of this is that
participants are able to set aside their own subjective utilities in
order to estimate their partners’. This would not occur if the over-
all correlations were due to an egocentric anchoring and adjust-
ment. Of course, these participants are very familiar with one
another and one might expect that they would be familiar with
their partners’ preferences.
Interestingly, we found a negative correlation between
the length of relationship between partners and the partial
coefficients between their predicted and actual judgments for
commodity items (r = −0.394, p < 0.01). This indicated that
familiarity is predictive of how close a surrogate utility judgment
is to another person’s actual preferences. But that the longer the
participants’ relationships were, then the less independent the
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predicted judgments were of their own utilities indicating that
familiarity may lead to greater projection.We found no such rela-
tionship for health judgments (r = −0.211, p > 0.05). This may
be because there is a greater variation in individual preferences
for commodity items (we may not all value art), but we share
similar preferences for good health.
Experiment Two
Experiment 1 demonstrated that people who are familiar with
one another are good at predicting each other’s preferences and
utility estimates for both health and commodity items. However,
it may be that people generally share similar preferences and util-
ities and that this agreement may be due not to familiarity with
another person, but to common estimates of the value of items.
In Experiment 2 we ask whether people who are relatively unfa-
miliar with each other, or who do not know each other at all
are able to predict each other’s utility judgments. We also test
the straightforward prediction that the relationship between sur-
rogate predictions of another person’s preferences is dependent
upon their ability to empathize with another person.
Method
Participants
The participants were recruited from the undergraduate popula-
tions at the University of Lincoln and the University of Notting-
ham. The Nottingham sample was composed of 84 females and
16 males, the Lincoln sample of 15 males and 71 females. Their
mean age was 22.61 years (sd = 2.60). The participants were allo-
cated to random dyads. This resulted in a total of 93 dyads, of
which 70 were same sex pairs. Less than half the participants (60)
said that they knew the other participant in their pair.
Materials
The materials were identical to those used in Experiment 1 with
the addition of the Davis (1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index to
measure perspective taking and empathy. This has four subscales
that map onto common conceptions of empathy namely Per-
spective Taking, Fantasy Scale, Empathic Concern, and Personal
Distress.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that used in Experiment One with
the exception that the assignment of participants to each dyad
was random and the participants completed the Davis Interper-
sonal Reactivity Index after the utility judgments. The order of
presentation for the utility judgments was fully randomized for
each participant. This study was approved by the Ethics com-
mittees in both the University of Lincoln and The University
of Nottingham Schools of Psychology and conforms to British
Psychological Society’s Code of Human Research Ethics.
Results
The average number of years that participants said they would
trade for the health items was 20.05 years (sd = 9.97) and pre-
dicted that the other participant in the dyad would trade on
average 20.49 years (sd = 10.28). This difference was not sig-
nificant (t185 = 1.17, se = 0.37, p = 0.24). However, the
average selling price for lifestyle items was slightly higher for
oneself ($1620.38, sd = 1885.61) than was predicted for other
participants in the dyads ($1449.58, sd = 1716.28, t185 = 2.27,
se = 75.18, p = 0.02).
As a measure of projection we first computed the within-
subject correlations between their own utility judgments and
what they predicted for their partner. The average projection cor-
relation between health utilities for oneself and predicted for the
other participant in each dyad was significant (mean r = 0.42,
sd = 0.41, t185 = 13.86, p < 0.001). The correlation between
lifestyle utilities for oneself and predicted for the other partic-
ipant was also significant (r186 = 0.48, sd = 0.42, t185 =
15.78, p < 0.001), and comparable to the correlation for health
utilities. These results nicely demonstrate a general agreement
between our own utilities and how much we think other peo-
ple might value the same items. However, this might merely be
a form of projected utility estimation. To determine the relation-
ship between those predictions we next computed the within-
subject correlations between the predicted utilities and the actual
stated utilities of the other participant in the dyad (i.e., accu-
racy). The average accuracy correlation between the predicted
health utilities and the other participants’ actual health utilities
was lower but nonetheless significant (mean r = 0.29, sd = 0.35,
t185 = 11.50, p < 0.001). The correlation between the predicted
commodity utilities and the other participants’ actual commod-
ity utilities was again lower but also significant (mean r = 0.25,
sd = 0.0.43, t185 = 7.74, p < 0.001).
The Somatic Distortion Theory predicts that people who
know each other will be better at predicting another person’s pref-
erence than those who do not. The average within-subject corre-
lation coefficients between predictions and actual preferences are
shown in Table 1. Fisher’s (1915) transformations showed that
the correlations between participants’ own and predicted utilities
(projection) and between predicted and actual utilities (accuracy)
TABLE 1 | Within-subject correlation coefficients for projection and for accuracy for health and lifestyle items shown separately for familiar and
unfamiliar dyads in Experiment 2.
Projection Accuracy
Health Lifestyle Health Lifestyle
r sd r sd r sd r sd
Familiar 0.478 0.371 0.607 0.364 0.369 0.375 0.369 0.445
Unfamiliar 0.385 0.423 0.421 0.427 0.257 0.329 0.186 0.413
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were significantly higher when the participants knew each other
compared to when they did not (t184 = 2.92, p = 0.004; and
t184 = 2.75, p = 0.006, respectively). There was no differ-
ence between familiar dyads in participants’ own and predicted
health utilities (t184 = 1.45, p = 0.15), but familiar dyads were
more closer in their predictions of their partners’ health utilities
(t184 = 2.07, p = 0.04).
To what extent are participants able to estimate another per-
son’s subjective utilities independently of their own preferences?
To measure surrogate accuracy independently of projection we
computed the correlation between the utility judgment that they
predicted their partner would make and their partners’ actual
utility judgment, controlling for their own stated utility. The
mean partial correlation coefficient for health items was sig-
nificantly greater than chance (mean r = 0.176, sd = 0.36,
t185 = 6.60, p < 0.001). For lifestyle items mean partial corre-
lation coefficient was also significant (mean r = 0.09, sd = 0.44,
t185 = 2.80, p = 0.006). Fisher’s (1915) transformation revealed
these two coefficients were significantly different from each other
(t185 = 2.13, p = 0.03). The difference in the correlations
between lifestyle and health items might be due to the desire for
good health being a shared value across participants and there
being more variety in participants’ preferences for lifestyle items.
Effects of Empathy
The somatic distortion model predicts that the extent to which
the predictions of the surrogate decision maker are accurate is
determined by their ability to empathize with another person.
What aspect of empathy enables a participant to make good pre-
diction about another person’s subjective utilities independently
of their own? To determine this we entered the four subscales
from the Davis IRI into separate multiple linear regressions to
predict the correlation coefficients for health and commodity
items separately for dyads who were familiar with one another
and those who were unfamiliar. The regression models were
not significant for the accuracy of the surrogate predictions (i.e.,
the correlations between predicted and other judgments). How-
ever, the regression models for the correlations between self and
predicted others were significant (i.e., projection). The results
shown in Table 2 indicate a different pattern of results for famil-
iar and unfamiliar dyads. Empathic concern is positively asso-
ciated with these projection measures (except unfamiliar dyads
for lifestyle items) indicating that the higher empathic concern
scores a surrogate has then the less likely they are to project
their own preferences. For the lifestyle items there was a posi-
tive relationship between perspective taking and the correlation
coefficients between judgments for self and predicted other indi-
cating a degree of projection, but a negative relationship between
empathic concern and the same judgments for self and predicted
other indicating that the more empathic concern a person has
then the less likely they are to project their own preferences.
However, unfamiliar dyads showed no projection in the relation-
ships between the IRI subscales and the correlation coefficients
for the lifestyle items. There were more statistical associations
between the IRI scales and the judgments made about health
items. Familiar dyads showed a positive relationship between the
fantasy scale scores and the projection correlation coefficients
between judgments for self and predicted other, and as observed
for the lifestyle items a negative relationship between empathic
concern and the health judgments for self and predicted other.
Unfamiliar dyads also showed a negative relationship between
empathic concern and the health judgments for self and pre-
dicted other, and a positive relationship between personal distress
and the health judgments for self and predicted other. Over-
all the most reliable predictor of the relationship between self
and predicted preferences for other people (i.e., projection) is
the empathic concern scale of the IRI. The negative nature of
this relationship indicates that the greater participants scored
on this scale then the less likely they were to project their own
preferences onto another person (i.e., the weaker the association
between the self-judgment and the predicted other judgment). In
other words, a higher empathic concern is associated with less
projection in surrogate decision-making.
Discussion
In two experiments we have shown that people are principally
able to estimate another person’s subjective utilities indepen-
dently of their own preferences. This is true for older adults in
TABLE 2 | Standardized regression coefficients for Davis Interpersonal Reactivity Indices as predictors of the correlation coefficients between self and
predicted other surrogate utility judgments for familiar and unfamiliar dyads in Experiment 2.
Projection Familiar Unfamiliar
β se t p β se t p
LIFESTYLE ITEMS
Perspective taking 0.31 0.01 2.11 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.92 0.36
Personal Distress −0.14 0.01 −1.07 0.29 0.15 0.01 1.55 0.12
Empathic Concern −0.30 0.02 −1.92 0.05 −0.18 0.01 −1.64 0.10
Fantasy −0.05 0.01 −0.37 0.71 0.13 0.01 1.32 0.19
HEALTH ITEMS
Perspective taking 0.16 0.01 1.15 0.25 0.10 0.01 1.01 0.32
Personal Distress −0.08 0.01 −0.60 0.55 0.28 0.01 3.07 <0.01
Empathic Concern −0.38 0.02 −2.43 0.02 −0.42 0.01 −4.03 <0.01
Fantasy 0.32 0.01 2.23 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.58 0.57
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long-term relationships, but also for younger adults who do not
know each other well. In older adults we found that the length of
people’s relationships was related to the degree to which the sur-
rogate projected their own preferences onto their partners pref-
erences for lifestyle items. The ability of the younger adults in
Experiment 2 to empathize with another person was predictive
of their ability to discard their own perspective and estimate the
other person’s utility judgments.
The two experiments reported here provide a novel method-
ology for assessing the relative accuracy of surrogate utility esti-
mation, and in doing so provide a useful means to assess the
conditions under which surrogate decision-making might be rel-
atively accurate and situations in which it might not. We have
shown that familiarity is predictive of the accuracy of surrogate
decision utility estimation for lifestyle items but not for health
items. Similarly, we have shown that at least one component of
empathy, namely empathic concern, is predictive of participants’
ability to make their surrogate utility estimation independent of
their own preferences.
Although these experiments are exploratory they nonethe-
less speak to the validity of the theories of surrogate decision-
making described earlier. Social Values Theory cannot in the form
described by Stone and Allgaier (2008) and Stone et al. (2013)
account for our participants’ ability to make utility judgments
of the kind described here on behalf of other people. That is
not to say that when asked to make surrogate decisions that the
decision-maker might not take into account the social accept-
ability or otherwise of their decision, but we see no reason why
surrogate decisions should be based on such a simple heuris-
tic. Indeed surely significant decisions that we might make on
behalf of other people will involve similar analytic processes as
those made for oneself. The Egocentric Anchoring and Adjust-
ment model (Epley et al., 2004; Epley and Gilovich, 2006) fares
better in that it predicts that decisions for oneself and for other
people involve analytic processing that can take the form of util-
ity estimation. The model is limited however because it does not
account for external (to the decision-making process) sources of
error such as the familiarity of the surrogate and beneficiary, or
internal sources of error such as the ability to set aside one’s own
perspective and simulate or adopt another person’s preferences.
Indeed this is precisely the result of the regressions reported in
experiment two in which people who score higher on perspective
taking are better able to separate their own utility judgment and
their prediction for another person. The data reported here are
consistent with the predictions made by the Somatic Distortion
Model in which participants decide upon their own preferences
before setting aside their own perspective and simulating what
they think the other person might prefer. This model accounts
for both internal and external sources of error such as familiarity
with the recipient and the decision-makers’ ability to empathize
with other people.
Concluding Remarks
Although these experiments do not speak directly to surrogate
decision making in a medical context they do demonstrate that
under optimal conditions, when there is no stress attached to
the decision, neither in terms of an evaluation of the surrogate
decision by the recipient (as in receiving a gift) nor in terms
of actually experiencing the consequences, people are capable
of estimating someone else’s values and judgments. Taking into
account someone else’s subjective utilities is a central foundation
of making a best interest judgment and it is thus encouraging to
see the high success rate.
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